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AN EXTENSION OF THE PUBLIC MEETING PRINCIPLE
The public has no common law right to attend meetings of governmental
bodies.' What has been described as a campaign by the press, assisted on occa-
sion by various civic groups2 and based on the proposition that secret meetings
are detrimental to the democratic process, that intelligent evaluation of the op-
eration of any policy body requires that the premises on which its decisions are
founded be made public,3 has led most of the states to enact some form of open
meeting statute.4 In 1967 the Illinois General Assembly greatly expanded the pro-
visions of the Meetings of Public Agencies Act. 5 The Act in its present form has
yet to be interpreted by the courts of Illinois. The purpose of this comment is to
inquire into the objectives of the Public Meetings Act, the nature of the gather-
ings or sessions to which the legislature intended the Act to apply, the require-
ments for public notice set forth, and the remedies and penalties available for en-
forcement.
OBJECTIVES AND APPLICATION
The Public Meetings Act begins with a statement of public policy that
"the public commissions, committees, boards and councils and the other pub-
lic agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is
the intent of this Act that their actions be taken openly and that their delibera-
tions be conducted openly." 6 The Act applies to:
All meetings of any legislative, executive, administrative or advisory
bodies of the State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated
towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,
bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any subsidiary
bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited to committees
and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in part by tax
revenue, or which expend tax revenue .... 7
The statute provides that these meetings "shall be public meetings."
Prior to the 1967 amendments the language of the Act may well have been
said to be "unequivocal and no guidelines .. .could make for more clarity than
already exists."9 Old section 41 stated the legislative intent to be that "ac-
1 Cross, The People's Right to Know 180-82 (1953).
2 Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 1199 (1962).
8 Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1651
(1965).
4 For a discussion of the various statutes see supra note 2.
Sill. Rev. Stat. ch. 102, § 41-44 (1969), [hereinafter cited as the Public Meetings Act].
6 Id. § 41.
7 Id. § 42.
8 Id. This section has been titled, "All official meetings open to the public-Exceptions."
The word "official" is misleading and it should be noted that House Bill No. 476, the primary
source of the legislation, did not give titles to any of the sections.
9 Johnson v. Board of Education of Chicago, 79 I1. App. 2d 22, 25, 223 N.E.2d 434, 436
207
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tions [of covered bodies shall] be taken openly and . . . oficial deliberations
[shall] be conducted openly."'10 (Emphasis added.) Old Section 42 required that
"All oficial meetings at which any legal action is taken by the governing bodies
... shall be public meetings ... ."11 (Emphasis added.)
A comparison of the old and the new reveals that the Public Meetings Act
has been extended to encompass gatherings not previously covered. Discussion
required to be held openly is no longer limited to official deliberation, nor are
the meetings ordered to be public limited to official sessions at which legal action
is taken by the governing bodies. If public knowledge of the considerations upon
which governmental action is based is essential to the democratic process,1 2 then
the newly amended Public Meetings Act is apparently a step forward in accom-
plishing the purpose of keeping the people apprised of the activities of their rep-
resentatives and the reasoning behind their official actions. The old Act was
seemingly capable of being evaded "through unannounced 'sneak' meetings and
through indulgence in euphemisms such as executive session, conference, caucus,
study or work session, and meeting of the committee of the whole."'18 An in-
formal conference at which secret discussion is held and decision made just short
of formal acceptance is hardly in keeping with a policy of informing the public
of the premises upon which governmental action is based.
However laudable the new statute may be, its language presents some am-
biguities which are difficult to resolve. The first two sections of the Act construed
together show that meetings required to be public are assemblies where there is
action taken or deliberation. Although meetings where action is taken rather
clearly connotes voting on a measure, 14 its companion, meetings where delibera-
tion is conducted, is, on its face, very vague, and any judicial interpretation will
most likely revolve around this phrase. One writer has aptly described the issue:
There is a spectrum of gatherings . . . that can be called a meeting,
ranging from formal convocations to transact business to chance en-
counters where business is discussed. However, neither of these two
extremes is an acceptable definition of the statutory word "meeting".
Requiring all discussions between members to be open and public
would preclude normal living and working by officials. On the other
hand, permitting secrecy unless there is a formal convocation of a body
invites evasion. In formulating a definition of "meeting" the public's
need for access to information must be balanced against the official's
(1967). (Question of whether a decision reached in secret was void was not decided because
it became moot).
10 Ch. 102, § 1, [1965] 111 Laws 2643.
11 Id. § 2.
12 Supra note 2, at 1200. See also for a critique of the open meeting principle.
Is Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Sup'rs, 263 Cal. App. 2d
41, 49, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480. 487 (1968).
14 California's Ralph M. Brown Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 54950-60 defines "action taken"
(§ 54952.6) as a:
... collective decision made by a majority ... a collective commitment or promise
by a majority . . . to make a positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a
majority... upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order or ordinance.
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need to act in an administratively feasible manner. Public officials must
be able to become acquainted with community problems in depth, to
test ideas without becoming publicly committed to them, and to feel out
opposition and begin compromise. The problem of the courts, legisla-
tive and executive departments is to find a definition of "meeting" that
can accommodate officials and still protect the public's access to in-
formation.15
The Illinois Public Meetings Act provides for punishment by fine or im-
prisonment for any person violating the provisions of the Act. 16 This, in itself,
is a compelling reason for clarification as to what constitutes a violation of the
Act, or stated differently, when a gathering of the members of the governmental
bodies becomes a "meeting" within the meaning of the Act.
A consideration of California's Ralph M. Brown Act'17 is appropriate at this
point. The Brown Act's statement of legislative intent has a familiar ring:
In enacting this chapter, the legislature finds and declares that the pub.
lic commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in
this state exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the
intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their
deliberations be conducted openly.'5
The Brown Act directs that all meetings of covered governmental bodies "shall
be open and public."' 9
Prior to 1967, Adler v. City Council of Culver City2" was the only California
appellate opinion to define "meeting" as used in the Brown Act. It held that stat-
ute applicable only to formal meetings for the transaction of official business and
inapplicable to informal sessions. A 1967 California decision, Sacramento News-
paper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of Supervisors,21 held that the Brown
Act was not intended to be of such limited application. The court reasoned, "Rec-
ognition of deliberation and action as dual components of the collective decision-
making process brings awareness that the meeting concept cannot be split off,
but rather comprehends both or either."122 Thus, action-taking and delibera-
tion are "functionally discernible steps, both of which must be taken in public
view.'"23 As for the slippery word "deliberation," the court found that it "con-
15 Supra note 3, at 1651.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 102, § 44 (1969). The Brown Act focuses the criminal penalty only
on the meeting where action is taken, not on the meeting confined to deliberation. This is a
recognition that public officials can sometimes guess wrong when confronted with an am-
biguous situation (J 54959).
17 Cal. Gov't Code § 54950-60.
18 Id. § 54950.
19 Id. § 54953.
20 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1960).
21 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1967). (Luncheon gathering of all five county
supervisors to discuss a strike against the county and the county's efforts to enforce an in-
junction secured in connection with the strike).
22 Id. at 47, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
28 Id. at 48, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
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notes not only collective discussion, but the collective acquisition and exchange
of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision. '24 The court, later in the opinion,
defined "meeting" as used in the Brown Act:
There is rarely purpose to a nonpublic pre-meeting conference except
to conduct some part of the decisional process behind closed doors.
Only by embracing the collective inquiry and discussion states, as well
as the ultimate step of official action, can an open meeting regulation
frustrate . . . evasive devices. As operative criteria, formality and in-
formality are alien to the law's design, exposing it to the very evasions
it was designed to prevent. Construed in the light of the Brown Act's
objectives, the term "meeting" extends to informal sessions or confer-
ences of the board members designed for the discussion of public
business.
25
The court's interpretation of "meeting" is in line with a policy that promotes
public awareness of the considerations behind the decisions of governmental
bodies.
The purpose of the Illinois General Assembly, in amending its Act, was not
simply to delete redundant words or to phrase an old law in a new way; the
legislature obviously intended an extension of the application of the Act to some-
thing beyond the formal action-taking concept. A practical limit is, as the Cal-
ifornia court said, the collective inquiry and discussion stage. This is not to say
that a social occasion where members of a body may happen to be present is a
meeting: "The difference between a social occasion and one arranged for pur-
suit of the public's business will usually be quite apparent. '26 The new Public
Meetings Act apparently commands that gatherings arranged for the pursuit of
the public's business must be public, regardless of whether any official action is
scheduled to be taken. Such an interpretation insures greater community evalua-
tion and participation in the process of government and more conscientious effort
on the part of their representatives to air their views on all issues.
EXCEPTIONS
Naturally, some matters occasionally come before various governmental
bodies which must be free from immediate public scrutiny because of sensitivity,
possible embarrassment to some individual persons or the possibility that the pur-
pose of the particular inquiry could be defeated by public exposure. The Illinois
Public Meetings Act recognizes this. 27 "Governmental employees should not be
put in a more public position than employees of private organizations when their
personal attributes are being discussed."'28 Similarly, "When possible disciplinary
action or dismissal is being considered, premature publicity can cause great and
24 Id. at 47, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
25 Id. at 50, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
26 Id. at 50, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487, n. 8.
27 Ml. Rev. Stat. ch. 102, § 42 (1969).
28 Supra note 3, at 1657.
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often unjustified damage to personal reputations. '29 Obviously, some bodies,
such as parole boards, juries, crime investigating boards, commerce commis-
sions, youth commissions and school disciplinary boards must because of their
very nature deliberate in secret. The Act recognizes that governmental units have
an attorney-client privilege.s0 The Act protects against land speculation at the
public's expense and removes temptation from possible double dealing officials
by providing that meetings to consider the purchase of, but not meetings to ac-
quire real property may be secret. In a rather "Do as I say and not as I do" pro-
vision, the General Assembly exempts itself from the operation of the statute. The
Act also recognizes, not startlingly, that it can be overruled by the Illinois Con-
stitution or Federal regulation.
NOTICE
An unannounced meeting behind an unlocked door is obviously not within
the spirit of the Public Meetings Act. Implicit in the words "public meeting" is
not only access to, but knowledge of, the times and places of the meetings re-
quired by the Act to be open. To this end sections were added to the Act in
196731 giving precise instructions as to the form and method of giving notice to
the public.
The Act requires that all covered bodies give annual notice of their schedule
of regular meetings, and a day's notice of any special, rescheduled or reconvened
meeting.3 2 Public notice is given by posting a copy of the notice at the body's
principal office, or if none exists, at the site of the meeting and by supplying
copies to local news media who have filed an annual request for such notice.
These media shall also be given the same notice of a special, rescheduled or re-
convened meeting in the same manner as is given members of the public body,
if a local address has been provided.
In addition, each public body subject to the statute must, at the beginning
of each year, make available a schedule of all its regular meetings and give ten
days' notice of any change in the regulation by publication, posting and supply-
ing copies of the change to any news media who have filed an annual request.
The notice requirements are in addition to, and not in substitution of, any other
notice required by law.
29 Supra note 2, at 1208.
30 IlM. Rev. Stat. ch. 102, § 42 (1969). (In the Sacramento case plaintiffs sought to en-
join future secret meetings of the county supervisors and county counsel. The court upheld
an attorney-client privilege, although it affirmed a preliminary injunction restraining all other
closed meetings. The Brown Act, unlike the Illinois Act, does not expressly allow govern-
mental bodies to meet in closed session to discuss pending lawsuits).
31 ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 102, § 42.01-.04 (1969).
32 Id. § 42.02.
However, this requirement of public notice of reconvened meetings does not apply
to any case where the meeting is to be reconvened within 24 hours nor to any case
where announcement of the time and place of the reconvened meeting was made at
the original meeting and there is no change in the agenda.
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ENFORCEMENT
Perhaps the most practical remedy when dealing with a violation of the Pub-
lic Meetings Act, in the case where official decision has been made at a secret
meeting, is invalidation of the action taken. The statute does not expressly pro-
vide this remedy as it does the remedy of mandamus 8 and the penalty of fine or
imprisonment.3 4 However, there is evidence, implicit in the statute and in case
law, that the statutory remedies were not meant to be exclusive. The Act provides
that "[f]alure... to receive notice... shall not invalidate any meeting provided
notice was in fact given . . . ."5 (Emphasis added.) These words are strong evi-
dence of an intent by the legislature that a meeting held when notice was not in
fact given, and consequently not public, shall be invalid.
The only Illinois court to consider the question held, on the one hand, that
action taken at a casual and unauthorized meeting was invalid, but went on to
allow the secretly made decision to be validated by vote in a formal and open
session.8 6 This case was decided prior to the 1967 amendments which extended
coverage of the Act to informal meetings where deliberation is conducted and it
brings to the fore a problem in light of the new Act: Shall open meetings where
action is taken be invalidated because deliberation was held in a secret meeting?
It has been suggested that it is unlikely that the courts will go this far."7 An op-
posing view is that public ratification of a secret decision could be used to cir-
cumvent the policy of open meeting statutes.38 Deliberations conducted and ac-
tion taken at a closed session are equally violative of the Act. If there is reason
to invalidate action taken in secret, then there is equal reason to invalidate an
open adoption of decisions reached in closed session.
Prior to 1967, the courts were authorized to issue writs of mandamus when
the provisions of the Act were not met. Granting of this relief was made discre-
tionary. This provision has been strengthened by requiring the courts to issue
the writ "[w]here the provisions of [the] Act are not complied with, or where
there is probable cause to believe that the provisions of [the] Act will not be
complied with .... ,,39 Other appropriate relief, presumably injunction, is au-
thorized. The practical difficulty with the remedy of mandamus is proving that a
violation is about to occur, but the remedy is useful as a means of prodding in-
advertent, but well-meaning members of a governmental body into compliance
without making criminals of them.
88 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 102, § 43 (1969).
84 Id. § 44.
85 Id. § 42.04.
80 Goldman v. Zimmer, 64 111. App. 2d 277, 212 N.E.2d 132 (1965). (Petition for con.
demnation authorized at a closed meeting of board of education members).
87 Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 1199, 1213 (1962).
88 Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California, 54 Calif. L Rev. 1651;
1664 (1965).
89 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 102, § 43 (1969).
NOTES AND COMMENTS 213
It is doubtful that the authorized criminal penalties will be imposed short
of flagrant and repeated violation of the Act. However, officials are not likely to
ignore the possibility of fine or jail sentence; thus, the provision adds the neces-
sary "teeth" to the statute.
HARRY J. BENSON
